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INTRODUCTION 
Judge Mark Walker ruled on February 1, 2018 that Florida’s vote-
restoration process had wrongly impacted 1.5 million Floridians’ right to 
vote. A Republican-led clemency board implemented this process, headed 
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by Governor Rick Scott.1 After being criticized for violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Governor Scott 
joined other Republican state politicians facing legal backlash from laws 
that courts have determined legislators intentionally enacted to 
discriminate against African-Americans attempting to participate in the 
political process or vote.2 During the past two years, courts have held that 
Texas, North Carolina, and Ohio practiced racial gerrymandering in an 
unlawful attempt to disenfranchise African-American voters.3 
Civil rights experts contend the verdict against Florida’s vote-
restoration process may refocus the nation’s eyes on the connections 
between voting rights, race, and Republican politics.4 Judge Walker 
viewed the arbitrary nature of the Florida voter-restoration scheme as part 
of an expanding trend in which Republican partisans—because of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s rollback of federal voting protections for racial 
minorities—are now trying to utilize voter identification and legislative 
gerrymandering to create a permanent electoral advantage.5 As Judge 
Walker stated, “This court is not blind to nationwide trends in which the 
spigot to access the United States’ most ‘precious’ and ‘fundamental’ 
right, the right to vote, depends on who controls the levers of power.”6 
Further, Judge Walker declared in his order, “[t]hat spigot is turned on or 
off depending on whether politicians perceive they will benefit from the 
expansion or contraction of the electorate.”7 Judge Walker’s opinion sends 
the message that the right to vote is so precious that the government should 
protect it regardless of which political party has access to power. 
Part I of this Article challenges the United States to reevaluate and 
protect the fundamental right to vote against racial targeting. Part II 
contends that the U.S. Supreme Court should reject the belief that race 
could be justified as a factor in legislative gerrymandering because race is 
too sensitive a factor to be considered when gerrymandering. Part II also 
argues that any consideration of race taints the equality principle, and the 
Court should reverse its 2001 holding in Easley v. Cromartie.8 Part II also 
                                                                                                             
 1. Patrick Jonsson, More than a third of all US ex-cons who can't vote live 
in Florida. Why?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.cs 
monitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/0212/More-than-a-third-of-all-US-ex-cons-who  
-can-t-vote-live-in-Florida.-Why [https://perma.cc/GC9C-4NS3].  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). 
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discusses Cooper v. Harris,9 which the Court decided 16 years after 
Easley. Cooper reveals how the Court repeated its failure in Easley by 
holding that reapportioning congressional districts required racial 
neutrality to promote nondiscrimination in an electoral democracy. Part III 
argues that the Court should reject partisan gerrymandering because 
partisanship has evolved into a proxy for maximizing racial bloc voting 
patterns. Part IV concludes with a practical solution for courts to handle 
gerrymandering cases by respecting conformity with traditional districting 
principles, such as compactness and respect for county lines, as long as 
those districts are established free of any partisan or racial considerations. 
I. AMERICA IS CHALLENGED TO REEVALUATE AND PROTECT THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE AGAINST RACIAL TARGETING 
A gerrymander represents a distortion of legislative district boundaries 
and populations because of partisan politics or separate specific motives.10 
Partisan political gerrymandering is expanding because discretionary 
redistricting provides an opportunity for one political party to give itself 
advantage over another political party.11 Those involved in legislative 
redistricting typically implement two techniques to create a partisan 
gerrymander: “packing” and “cracking.”12 The packing strategy “packs” 
the opposing party’s supporters into a comparatively small number of 
districts to help the opposing party win big majorities in a small number 
of districts but lose a large majority of the districts.13 “Cracking” cracks or 
rips the opposing party’s voters so badly that it virtually guarantees the 
opposing party voters, although large in number, are an unsuccessful 
minority party in all of the targeted districts.14 
Partisan gerrymandering is particularly harmful for at least two 
primary grounds.15 First, a partisan gerrymander is likely to permit a 
political party possessing a minority of the popular vote to take command 
over a majority of the seats in the state assembly, as well as its state’s 
representatives in the House of Representatives.16 Second, a partisan 
gerrymander is likely to permit “a party that possess only a slim majority 
                                                                                                             
 9. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017). 
 10. Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 
405 (1993). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 406. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 407. 
 16. Id. 
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in popular vote over its main political challenger . . . to convert this slim 
popular vote advantage into a tactical established ascendency.”17 Whether 
a gerrymander establishes a majority party or disproportionately expands 
the majority’s power when compared to the votes actually received, a 
gerrymander unfairly risks establishing a partisan imbalance so expertly 
that the legislature becomes indifferent to the desires of a changing voting 
demographic.18 
According to Bryan Sells, a civil rights lawyer in Atlanta, America is 
in a new moment because this nation is “reevaluating the value of the right 
to vote and of unrigged systems. It’s not because the system was less 
rigged before. People are just caring about it more in the last five years.”19 
The U.S. Supreme Court should hold that a state may not target African-
American voters in the election process for either racial or partisan 
reasons.  
In today’s politics, race and partisan political identity have evolved 
into one. This nation has witnessed a 21st-century explosion of election-
related targeting laws Republican-controlled legislatures adopted over the 
opposition of both Democrats and civil rights supporters.20 Examples of 
election-related targeting laws contested along partisan and racial lines 
include a litany of Republican-sponsored voting restrictions, such as strict 
voter ID laws, voter registration and early voting restraints, and the 
treatment of provisional ballots.21 Democrats and civil rights groups attack 
these Republican-sponsored restrictions because they unjustifiably 
suppress involvement in the election process by a number of eligible racial 
minority voters who usually support Democrats.22 Civil rights activists 
correctly contend these 21st-century burdens on the right to vote 
effectively deny racial minorities the right to vote by diluting their roles in 
the electoral process.23 “Vote dilution” in the context of racial politics is 
more than an absence of proportional representation; it does not occur 
when elected officials fail to mirror on a proportional basis a racial group’s 
voting potential ability.24 Plaintiffs in a voter dilution case must 
demonstrate under the totality of the circumstances standard that the 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Jonsson, supra note 1. 
 20. Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 761, 766 (2018). 
 21. Id. at 761. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 766–67. 
 24. Captain Frederick G. Slabach, Equal Justice: Applying the Voting Rights Act 
to Judicial Elections, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 823, 850 (1994) (citing White v. Regester, 
412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973)) (identifying dilution under the Constitution). 
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political processes involving the nomination and election were not equally 
accessible to minority group involvement, attacking the process.25 A 
minority group is required to show that its members do not have the same 
opportunity as other groups to contribute to the political process and to 
elect their preferred officials.26 
Although Republicans implemented their vote-denial policies against 
racial minorities, they also used their control over redistricting by 
gerrymandering both the U.S. House of Representatives and state legislative 
districts.27 Gerrymandering allows the controlling political party to entrench 
itself in power by diluting votes cast for a rival party.28 For example, a 
simple Republican gerrymandering strategy is to pack Democrats into a 
small number of districts to create safe Republican majorities but 
simultaneously pack African Americans—who, as a collective, consistently 
vote for Democrats—inside a small number of districts which produces a 
promising election map for Republicans.29 Racial-political polarization 
helps to explain why Republican-dominated legislatures have racially 
gerrymandered Congressional and state legislative districts to implement 
majority-minority districts and effectively “dilute” the political impact of 
minority votes.30 Racial gerrymandering is extremely challenging since it 
dilutes the votes of racial minorities under contemporary America’s single 
electoral practice for casting ballots for legislators.31 Because African-
Americans and Hispanics disproportionately reside in geographically 
condensed inner cities without a proportional representation model, racial, 
minority vote-dilution will continue to exist as an inherent feature of 
American democracy.32 
Since 2016, several federal courts have issued decisions finding that 
states and localities practiced intentional discrimination in framing their 
voting and election laws.33 Intentional discrimination assertions in the 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. (citing White, 412 U.S. at 769). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Tokaji, supra note 20, at 767. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 768. 
 30. M. Akram Faizer, Reinforced Polarization: How the Roberts Court’s 
Recent Decision to Invalidate the Voting Rights Act’s Coverage Formula Will 
Exacerbate the Divisions That Bedevil U.S. Society, 45 CUMB. L. REV. 303, 325 
(2014–15). 
 31. Id. at 326. 
 32. Id. at 327. 
 33. Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing 
Discriminatory Intent In Voting Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 779, 780 
(2018) (citing Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) (remanding a 
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setting of voting rights litigation virtually always generate the issue of 
disentangling race from party.34 Race and partisan connection are 
repeatedly linked in modern politics, especially in the South.35 When race 
and partisanship align, the usual state politician defense is that the 
legislators are implementing their plans for predominantly partisan 
purposes with only incidental race-based motives.36 Because of the strong 
link between partisan politics and race-based politics, the Supreme Court 
has held that to succeed in a racial gerrymandering case in which race and 
party truly correlate, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that race, not partisan 
politics, was the predominant motive.37 Courts should reject partisan 
motives as a proxy defense for targeting African-Americans, as well as 
other minority voters, to create marginalization in the political process.38  
Racial targeting to marginalize voters is intentional discrimination 
even if that marginalization was driven primarily by a political scheme and 
not racial hostility.39 The Fourth Circuit asserted: “Using race as a proxy 
for party may be an effective way to win an election. But intentionally 
targeting a particular race’s access to the franchise because its members 
                                                                                                             
discriminatory purpose finding regarding Texas’s strict photo ID law, but holding 
that “there remains evidence to support a finding that the cloak of ballot integrity 
could be hiding a more invidious purpose”); Terrebonne Par. Branch NAACP v. 
Jindal, 2017 WL 3574878 (M.D. La. Aug. 17, 2017) (finding that the at-large 
voting system for election of judges was maintained for a discriminatory purpose); 
Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that 
the City of Pasadena, Texas, intentionally discriminated against Latino voters in 
changing its city governance structure); Perez v. Abbott, 2017 WL 1787454 
(W.D. Tex. May 2, 2017) (holding that the Texas Legislature intentionally 
discriminated against Latino voters in drawing the 2011 congressional 
redistricting plan); One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 925 (W.D. 
Wis. 2016) (finding that Wisconsin’s restrictions on in-person absentee voting 
were motivated by discriminatory intent)). 
 34. Id. at 788. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (citing Veasey, 830 F.3d at 303 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“The law 
reflects party politics, not racism, and the majority of this court—in their hearts—
know this.”)). 
 37. Id. (citing Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)). See, e.g., Richard 
L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy 
Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1837 (2018). 
 38. Lang & Hebert, supra note 33, at 788. 
 39. See id. 
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vote for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes 
discriminatory purpose.”40 
Since the partisan gerrymandering evolution is virtually indistinguishable 
from racial gerrymandering, the Supreme Court should put an end to them 
both to breathe new life into the equal protection concept and promote 
electoral democracy in America. 
II. RACE IS TOO SENSITIVE A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN 
LEGISLATIVE GERRYMANDERING 
North Carolina has continued to encounter the intersection of race and 
partisan gerrymandering. In 1993, in a North Carolina case, Justice 
O’Connor appropriately interpreted the meaning of the constitutional right 
to vote and the correctness of race-based state legislation designed to 
benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups as 
two very complex and sensitive issues that continue to appear before the 
Supreme Court.41 Because of the 1990 census, North Carolina was entitled 
to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. The North Carolina 
General Assembly passed a reapportionment strategy that contained one 
majority-black congressional district.42 After the Attorney General of the 
United States objected to the plan under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (“VRA” or “Act”), the General Assembly approved new legislation 
establishing a second majority-black district.43 In the 1993 North Carolina 
case of Shaw v. Reno, the plaintiffs raised the complicated issue of whether 
a modified race-conscious redistricting plan and district boundary lines 
create an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.44 A review of the North 
Carolina litigation odyssey supports the argument that race is too sensitive 
a factor—because of its historical baggage—to be a factor in the context 
of partisan gerrymandering.  
A. Easley v. Cromartie 
Easley is the descendant of Shaw I.45 In Shaw I, the Court held that 
proof of North Carolina’s drawing of district boundaries for race-based 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. (quoting N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 
222 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017)); One Wis. Inst. v. 
Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 925 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 41. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 633–34. 
 45. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001). 
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reasons could establish that the legislature violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.46 In Easley, the Supreme Court reviewed and rejected a three-
judge district court’s decision that the North Carolina Legislature used 
race as the predominant factor in drawing its 12th Congressional District’s 
boundaries.47 The Court found the district court’s findings clearly 
erroneous and reversed the lower court’s conclusion that North Carolina 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.48  
This racial districting litigation appeared before the Supreme Court 
four times, and each time the Court failed to get it right. The Court’s first 
two rulings focused on North Carolina’s old 12th Congressional District, 
one of two North Carolina congressional districts containing a majority of 
African-American voters.49 The Court held that an equal protection 
violation may exist in the drawing of a legislative boundary that is race-
neutral on its face if that boundary drawing is only rationally understood 
as a plan to isolate voters into individual districts because of their race, and 
there is no adequate justification for that racial isolation.50 
In Easley and its three predecessors involving the North Carolina 
Legislature’s use of race as a factor in drawing congressional districts’ 
boundaries, the Court’s holdings were wrong because race should never 
be used as a factor when a legislature gerrymanders boundaries.51 The 
Court should reconsider its suggestion in gerrymandering that race may be 
used as a factor in drawing district boundaries as long as it is not a 
predominant factor52 because using race as a factor is simply unworkable 
in gerrymandering cases. Patricia Okonta supports the position that racial 
gerrymandering occurs in redistricting when state legislators approve 
reapportionment plans to “stack, crack, or pack clusters of minority voters 
in single-member district systems.”53 According to Okonta, civil rights 
advocates have utilized non-race-neutral redistricting plans to empower 
disenfranchised minorities to choose by ballot their desired candidates, but 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 1. 
 47. Easley, 532 U.S. 234. 
 48. Id. at 237; see U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 1. 
 49. Easley, 532 U.S. at 237; see Shaw, 509 U.S. 630; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 
899 (1996). 
 50. Easley, 532 U.S. at 237–38. 
 51. Id. at 238. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Patricia Okonta, Race-Based Political Exclusion And Social Subjugation: 
Racial Gerrymandering As A Badge Of Slavery, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
254, 255 (quoting STEVEN A. LIGHT, “THE LAW IS GOOD”: THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT, REDISTRICTING AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS 22 (2010)). 
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new plans have been applied to achieve the opposite goal.54 Those new 
plans may use racial gerrymandering to exploit racially polarized voting 
to reduce minorities’ potential to elect a preferred candidate.55 Since the 
Supreme Court prohibits public school officials from admitting students 
to public schools using race as a factor, then, by analogy, North Carolina 
should not be allowed to set district boundaries by using race as a factor, 
since the way to accomplish legislative redistricting without considering 
race56 is to stop establishing district boundaries by using race as a factor.57 
Under the Supreme Court’s big-picture, race-neutral rationale as 
articulated in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District, the way to stop gerrymandering discrimination in redistricting 
boundaries is to stop using race as a factor in drawing those boundaries.58 
In Shaw II, the Court likewise reversed a three-judge district court 
decision that held that the boundary-drawing law in question did not 
violate the Constitution.59 The Court found that the district’s 
“predominately African-American racial makeup, and its history, together 
demonstrated an intentional plan to create a ‘majority-black’ district” in 
which race was the predominant factor in designing the district and the 
district boundaries were not “designed to ‘protec[t] Democrat 
incumbents.’”60 The Court’s conclusion in Shaw II was correct in that the 
Constitution was violated,61 but the Court’s belief that race could 
justifiably be a factor in legislative gerrymandering should be rejected as 
impractical. Any consideration of race taints the equality principle in the 
gerrymandering process and obstructs the goal of representative 
democracy.62 
The Court’s third holding focused on a newly redrawn North Carolina 
12th Congressional District.63 A three-judge district court,64 with one 
judge dissenting, granted summary judgment to those challenging the 
                                                                                                             
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
747–48 (2007). 
 57. Id. at 748. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 238 (2001). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Contra id. 
 63. Id. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
 64. Harris S. Ammerman, Three Judge Courts: See How They Run!, 52 F.R.D. 
293 (1971) (“Three-judge courts hear injunction cases alleging unconstitutionally 
of federal or state statutes.”). 
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congressional district’s boundaries.65 The federal district court held that 
the North Carolina Legislature had once again used criteria that, on its 
face, focused on race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.66 The 
federal district court grounded its decision on substantial facts revealing 
that the boundaries established an abnormally designed district—the 
boundaries divided counties as well as cities.67 The facts also highlighted 
that the new congressional district contained virtually all the Democratic-
registered, largely African-American, voting precincts but placed 
Democratic-registered, largely white precincts, outside the district.68 The 
North Carolina Legislature’s relocation of the predominately white 
precincts outside the 12th Congressional District is reliable evidence that 
the legislative goal was to maximize the new 12th District’s African-
American voting power and not simply to maximize the district’s voting 
power for Democrats.69  
Upon Supreme Court review, in its third holding, the Court again 
rejected the district court’s holding that North Carolina’s 12th District was 
shaped the way it was because of race.70 The Court failed to recognize that 
the North Carolina Legislature was preoccupied with the racial makeup of 
the district and not the relatively secondary partisan nature of the district.71 
The Court rejected the district court’s position that the new 12th 
Congressional District’s appearance, the manner in which it divided towns 
and counties, and its largely African-American voting population, should 
have allowed the plaintiffs to prevail in the case.72 All of these activities 
show a preoccupation with the racial makeup of the district, not the 
secondary effects of partisan politics.73  
Evidence of the shape of a district united with the evidence of African-
American Democratic registration is sufficient to demonstrate, on 
summary judgment, the unconstitutional race-based taint, because only a 
preoccupation with race can reasonably explain the redistricting plan.74 
The Supreme Court conceded that race was a significant factor in North 
Carolina’s redistricting plan, but, unfortunately, the Court concluded there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the evidence was 
                                                                                                             
 65. Easley, 532 U.S. at 238. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 238–39. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Contra id. at 239. 
 72. Id. at 238–39. 
 73. Contra id. 
 74. Contra id. 
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consistent with the constitutional partisan objective of producing a safe 
Democratic seat.75  
The Court’s third holding was ill-advised because it failed to realize 
that the government should never utilize race as a factor in gerrymandering 
a legislative district. Any use of race in shaping a congressional or 
legislative district fatally taints the equal protection standard and blocks 
free and fair elections in America. The Court should have adopted the 
position that it is never permissible to use race as a factor in redistricting 
a congressional district because true voting equality requires using race-
neutral traditional demographics and prohibiting the use of partisan 
politics while redistricting.76  
The Court’s fourth consideration of North Carolina’s redistricting 
scheme in Easley v. Cromartie from an equal protection perspective 
demonstrated that it is virtually impossible to reliably measure the race 
factor while a state is engaging in a congressional gerrymandering 
process.77 The record contained little evidence supporting the district 
court’s conclusion that the 12th Congressional District plan only 
considered race as a minor factor since the relevant evidence included 
Senator Cooper’s declaration that racial balancing was a primary goal of 
redistricting a new 12th District and not democratic partisan concerns.78  
In a North Carolina racial gerrymandering case, the Supreme Court 
failed to follow the clearly erroneous standard for factual finding by 
declaring, “The evidence taken together, however, does not show that 
racial considerations predominated in the drawing of District 12’s 
boundaries. That is because race in this case correlates closely with 
political behavior.”79 According to Justice Thomas, the only proper issue 
for the Supreme Court to consider regarding North Carolina’s new 12th 
Congressional District was whether the district court’s factual conclusion 
that race was the predominant factor was clearly erroneous.80  
 Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s conclusion about the trial 
court’s decision regarding the predominant purpose of the 12th District 
gerrymandering plan.81 In dissent, Justice Thomas said that because the 
district court’s conclusion that race was the predominant factor motivating 
the North Carolina Legislature constituted a factual finding, the Supreme 
Court could not overturn the district court’s factual finding unless it was 
                                                                                                             
 75. Contra id. 
 76. Contra id. 
 77. Contra id. at 257. 
 78. Contra id. 
 79. Contra id. 
 80. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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clearly erroneous.82 Thomas reminded the Court that an intentional 
discrimination determination is a conclusion of fact.83 He stated: “Where 
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice 
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”84 According to Justice 
Thomas, when the Court conceded that the evidence reasonably pointed to 
either a partisan or racial motive for creating the new 12th District under 
the Court’s precedent, the district court’s decision simply could not be 
clearly erroneous.85 The Supreme Court should reject the district court’s 
conclusion of facts only if it possesses an unambiguous and well-founded 
belief that an error was made.86  
In this most recent iteration of the North Carolina congressional 
districts, the basic equal protection question the Court avoided was 
whether the Constitution should prohibit the North Carolina Legislature in 
establishing the new 12th District’s boundaries from considering either 
race or partisanship as factors, because our Constitution has evolved to 
race and partisan neutrality in gerrymandering.87 In a case involving the 
gerrymandering of districts, because racial identification often correlates 
to partisan political affiliation, the person attacking the legislatively drawn 
boundaries should only be required to prove that the state used race or 
partisanship as a factor to prove an illegitimate violation of the equal 
protection principle.88 When race or partisanship is not a factor in 
establishing congressional redistricting, the legislature acts consistently 
with necessary race-neutral and partisan-neutral redistricting principles.89  
The Court should reverse its decision in Easley that allows race to be 
a factor in gerrymandering legislative boundaries when a partisan motive 
is also equally plausible.90 The Court should abandon its rationale in 
Easley and declare the fundamental principle that, like unconstitutional 
racial discrimination in public school education, using race as a factor in 
gerrymandering legislative districts is a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.91 The Court should also proclaim that all federal, state, and local 
laws requiring or permitting the use of race as a factor in congressional 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 
 85. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
 87. See id. at 257. 
 88. Contra id. at 258. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 234. 
 91. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955). 
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redistricting must yield to the race neutrality principle.92 Future 
gerrymandering cases applying the race neutrality principle or a partisan-
neutral concept to establish congressional boundaries will present 
opportunities for the Court to consider the manner in which it will accord 
relief.93 
Since the issue being appealed in Easley was an evidentiary question 
of fact,94 the only relevant issue before the appellate court under the proposed 
race-neutral or partisan-neutral gerrymandering standard should be whether 
there is plausible factual evidence to support the district court’s conclusion 
that race or partisanship was a factor, regardless of whether North Carolina’s 
legislative motive was predominantly political and not racial.95 In making its 
evidentiary determination, the Court followed its flawed burden of proof 
required in gerrymandering cases alleging racial discrimination in Shaw I and 
later cases.96 Under current case law, in a situation involving a racial 
gerrymandering, the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs who claim that a 
legislature has improperly used race as a factor to produce a majority-
minority district.97 The gerrymandering plaintiffs must prove the 
“legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to 
racial considerations.”98 The Court should abandon its current case law 
involving gerrymandering and hold that a successful plaintiff challenging 
the use of race as a factor while gerrymandering must only prove that true 
race neutral principles were utilized, which would prohibit any 
consideration of race as a factor. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s racially tainted gerrymandering 
precedents, race should not be a permissible motivating factor when a 
legislature draws a majority-minority district under the equal protection 
principle.99 The Court requires plaintiffs in a gerrymandering case to prove 
that race was the predominant factor motivating a legislature districting 
decision.100 A correct reading of the equal protection principle in a 
gerrymandering case would require the plaintiff to prove only that race is 
a factor, not that it is the predominant factor, to establish an Equal 
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Protection Clause violation. If a plaintiff proves that one cannot rationalize 
a facially neutral law with any justifications except race,101 the plaintiff 
has implicitly proved by circumstantial evidence that race is an 
unacceptable tainted factor.102 The African-American experience reveals 
that when race is a factor in gerrymandering of congressional districts, race 
virtually always becomes a tainted predominating factor. The only way to 
assure that the legislature utilizes race-neutral redistricting principles is to 
prohibit the legislature from giving any consideration to race or partisan 
politics in the gerrymandering process.103  
B. Cooper v. Harris 
In Cooper v. Harris, Justice Kagan declared that the U.S. Constitution 
delegates the task of establishing congressional districts to the states.104 It 
is the author’s belief that an appropriate reading of the Constitution, 
however, would prohibit the use of race as a factor in redistricting those 
congressional districts.105 The Court has consistently held, “[a] State may 
not use race as the predominant factor in drawing district lines unless it 
has a compelling reason”;106 a state should never be allowed, however, to 
use race as a factor in establishing congressional district lines under any 
circumstances. Any consideration of race in the redistricting process is an 
unreasonable separate-but-equal poison pill.107 
Cooper involved North Carolina’s latest redrawing of two 
congressional districts, both of which have historically contained a 
substantial number of black voters.108 In its present incarnation, District 1 
is anchored in northeastern North Carolina, with attachments extending 
both south and west—the west into Durham.109 District 12 starts in south-
central North Carolina, which includes a large section of Charlotte, and 
next journeys northeast, zig-zagging much of the way to North Carolina’s 
northern border.110 The two districts have quite a history before the 
                                                                                                             
 101. Contra Easley, 532 U.S. at 241–42. 
 102. Contra id. at 242. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017). 
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Supreme Court.111 The Supreme Court first encountered the 1992 versions 
of the two districts in Shaw v. Reno.112 
 In Cooper, a three-judge district court held that North Carolina 
officials violated the Equal Protection Clause because they considered race 
as the predominant factor when the state redistricted the two districts in 
which the voting-age populations were majority black.113 The Supreme 
Court correctly affirmed the district court’s conclusion that North Carolina 
violated the equal protection principle; the Court’s rationale for the 
violation, however, is unacceptable. The Court should reject its prior 
precedents and hold that North Carolina’s redistricting plan violates the 
equal protection principle if the legislature gives any consideration to race. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly 
understood, should prohibit any consideration of race as a factor when a 
state gerrymanders its congressional districts.114 The equal protection 
principle prevents a state from utilizing race as a factor to justify 
separating its citizens into different voting districts.115 When a voter sues 
state officials for drawing district lines and considering race as a factor, 
the Court should apply a simple and manageable, one-step analysis.116 The 
challenger to the redistricting plan should have to prove race is a factor 
influencing the legislature’s determination to locate a substantial number 
of voters inside or outside of a specific district.117 If a challenger 
demonstrates that, despite the use of other traditional factors such as 
compactness or respect for political subdivisions, any consideration of 
race in gerrymandering creates a partisan advantage violating the equal 
protection principle.118 The challenger’s proof of race as a factor could 
consist of “direct evidence” of legislative purpose or circumstantial 
evidence. Circumstantial evidence includes the district’s appearance and 
demographics, which only a consideration of the race factor can 
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reasonably explain.119 Because racial considerations in reality are virtually 
never subordinate to other considerations in the design of the district, the 
Court should prohibit any use of race in the gerrymandering process.120 
Once the challenger proves that race was a factor in the design of a 
legislative district, the challenger should prevail because the equal 
protection principle of fair and equal representation for all voters prohibits 
the state from using race as a factor in the sorting of voters to serve even 
a supposed “compelling interest” that is allegedly “narrowly tailored” to 
achieve that goal.121 
The Court should reject its long-held assumption that race may be a 
factor under its compelling interest rationale to comply with operative 
provisions of the VRA122 in favor of a true race-neutral approach, which 
strictly prohibits any consideration of race. Two provisions of the VRA—
§§ 2 and 5—were considered in Cooper.123 Section 2 makes a paradigm, 
practice, or procedure that produces an exclusion or abridgement of the 
right to vote because of race unlawful.124 Unlike § 2, prior to the Court’s 
canceling of § 5’s coverage formula, § 5 mandated specific states, as well 
as several counties in North Carolina, to pre-clear voting adjustments or 
amendments with the Department of Justice to preempt a deterioration in 
the voting capacity of racial minorities.125 The government should give all 
Americans the opportunity to elect their preferred candidate, regardless of 
race, because race should never be a factor to enhance or dilute a specific 
group’s chance to elect their preferred candidate.126 
A state should not be allowed to invoke the VRA to support race-based 
districting because litigation experience provides strong evidence that the 
statute must now require race neutrality by all the relevant actors to avoid 
laying a trap for an unwary legislature.127 If a legislature uses race as a 
factor in its redistricting plan, a court may reject “its redistricting plan as 
either (1) unconstitutional racial gerrymandering should the legislature 
place a few too many minority voters in a district or (2) retrogressive under 
§ 5 should the legislature place a few too few.”128 If the legislature is 
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prohibited from giving any consideration to race in the gerrymandering 
process, it would not have to worry about the trap of trying to decide how 
much race consideration is too much and how much race consideration is 
not enough.129 If legislative reapportionment could not use race as a factor 
to dilute or enhance a group’s voting power, the state now has “good 
reasons” under the Act to design a single district line with a reduced 
reliance on partisan politics.130 The “strong basis” for “race conscious 
reasons” typically gives states breathing room to implement fake race-
conscious compliance measures that produce foreseeable racial 
discrimination in the electoral process at the expense of cross-racial 
coalition building in the reapportionment process.131 Professor Lani Guinier 
has described cross-racial coalition building as involving a situation in 
which a person is not confined to a minority outlook and a person is certainly 
not abandoned because of the outlook selected.132 
The Supreme Court still retains full power to correct and reverse its 
understanding of the law and adopt this recommended analysis by 
requiring complete race neutrality in legislative reapportionment cases. 
Under this analysis and the proposed constitutional standard, any American 
court’s findings of fact that a racial consideration was a factor in drawing 
district lines makes that district unconstitutional. As Justice Thomas 
observed, “Because racial gerrymandering offends the Constitution whether 
the motivation is malicious or benign. It is not a defense that the legislature 
merely may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that blacks are 
reliable Democratic voters.”133 By continuing to use race as a predominant 
factor in the politics of gerrymandering, America’s opportunity for a 
growing and inclusive democracy diminishes. 
III. BOTH PARTISAN AND RACIAL GERRYMANDERING SHOULD BE 
REJECTED BECAUSE THERE IS NO REASONABLE WAY TO DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN THE TWO  
Intentional discrimination claims in situations involving gerrymandering 
produce difficulty in separating race from partisan politics.134 When race and 
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partisan politics are linked to gerrymandering “as they so often do in modern 
politics, particularly in the South—a common defense is that the legislators 
acted for partisan reasons, not for race-based ones.”135 Since the Supreme 
Court has failed to develop any manageable objective standards to separate 
partisan motives from racial motives in gerrymandering cases, the Court 
should abandon its current requirement that to succeed in a racial 
gerrymandering case, in which race and party closely correlate, the plaintiffs 
must be able to show that race, not partisan politics, was the predominant 
motive.136 The Court should instead adopt the position that, to prevail, a 
plaintiff must prove only that race was a factor in the partisan redistricting 
gerrymandering process. 
A. Partisan Politics as an Illegitimate Defense Where Race Is a Factor in 
Legislative Redistricting  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit identified the 
problem in utilizing race as a factor in a partisan gerrymandering case.137 
The Fourth Circuit’s approach to gerrymandering, although appropriate, 
may not effectively discourage those legislators who present partisan 
motives as an affirmative defense for racially targeting minority voters.138 
The Fourth Circuit’s holding that those who raise partisan political 
motives to justify targeting black and minority voters for exclusion from 
the political process by gerrymander is, without a reasonable doubt, 
discriminatory.139 By analogy, it should be equally true under the rationale 
of the Fourth Circuit that a court should treat the targeting of African-
Americans or racial minorities when redistricting congressional districts 
even if inspired by a political scheme and not racial animus as 
discriminatory.140 Under the rationale of the Fourth Circuit, exploiting race 
as a proxy for party may successfully redistrict the legislature to prevail in 
an election, but it is not a fair way to protect or promote equal 
representation.141 To intentionally target a particular race, however, and 
place them in a legislative district while redistricting because its members 
vote for a certain party, in an expected routine, establishes discriminatory 
purpose. The Fourth Circuit did not unequivocally declare that race is an 
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impermissible factor in either partisan or racial gerrymandering because 
targeting African-American and other racial minority voters for 
marginalization in the political process is discriminatory even if the 
motivating factor is predominantly partisan rather than racially hostile.142 
A more progressive Fourth Circuit decision would have asserted that 
exploiting race as a proxy for political advantage is not an acceptable way 
to win an election because any use of race under the circumstances is a 
divisive poison pill that harms representative democracy. The Fourth 
Circuit should have prohibited the legislature from intentionally using race 
in the reapportionment process, even for a predominately partisan motive, 
because to do so demeans those adversely affected.143  
Completely removing race and partisan advantage as factors from 
redistricting law provides structural and institutional certainty under a 
different equal protection analysis that is completely race neutral.144 When 
state actors violate clear rules that prohibit the consideration of either the 
race factor or partisan advantage, judges using other traditional equal 
protection principles should become very predictable.145 According to 
Gary Michael Parsons, predictability by judges addressing the partisan 
politics issue represents good public policy because it helps to shield the 
dispensation of redistricting justice from claims of unfair partisanship.146  
Redistricting law should utilize other traditional equal protection 
principles to prohibit the use of either race or partisan political advantage. 
In a situation involving partisan or racial gerrymandering, the Court should 
embrace equitable principles that absolutely prohibit any consideration of 
race or political advantage when enacting a redistricting plan.147 
The Court’s usual treatment of partisan gerrymandering under equitable 
principles avoids any commitment to racial neutrality under equal protection 
principles but, at the same time, accommodates racial or partisan 
stereotyping.148 The Supreme Court attacks the government’s invidious 
racial discrimination, yet the Court inconsistently and incoherently accepts 
partisan gerrymanders as a defense in racial gerrymandering litigation,149 
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and the Court rejects plaintiffs’ allegations that partisan politics represent a 
very thinly disguised pretext for racial gerrymandering.150 If partisan 
gerrymandering can accommodate the race factor as legitimate, then 
partisan gerrymandering under the equal protection principle may also 
prohibit the use of the race factor as illegitimate because partisan politics 
is so easily manipulated as a tool for racial targeting.151 For instance, 
following the last census, legislators sorted voters by race with a pretext 
of serving a legitimate constitutional purpose—prohibiting racial vote 
dilution—but actually achieving an unconstitutional predominant purpose 
of racial targeting by calling it a partisan vote advantage effort.152  
If the Supreme Court wants to establish certainty in the redistricting 
process, the Court should prohibit any consideration of partisan politics in 
the gerrymandering process. The Court should also deny the states the 
power to use partisan politics to defend racial targeting in redistricting 
cases.153 An equal protection analysis prohibiting any consideration of race 
or partisan politics “would begin to fill the doctrinal gap in redistricting 
jurisprudence and help bring certainty to legislators navigating the”154 
redistricting process. Both partisan-neutral politics and race-neutral 
redistricting practices help to promote the goal of allowing redistricting 
law to become analytically consistent, predictable, and not as likely to be 
exposed to either partisan or racial manipulation by legislators or 
litigants.155 Predictability in how the Court will rule in a gerrymandering 
case will not work until the Court is prepared to hold that consideration of 
either partisan politics or race is prohibited in the gerrymandering process. 
B. Redistricting’s Legitimate Goal Is Fair Representation 
Gerrymandering became a significant issue in the 2018 midterm 
elections.156 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court redrew the state’s GOP-
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controlled congressional map.157 According to one commentator, 
Democrats would have gained approximately 37 Congressional House 
seats in the 2018 midterm elections.158 While Democrats actually accrued 
39 seats,159 the total seats for Democrats could have been larger but for 
Republican gerrymandering in particular states.160 A contrast between the 
2018 House election outcomes in North Carolina and Pennsylvania 
demonstrate the capacity of gerrymandering to distort the number of 
legislative seats that a specific political party won based on the percentage 
of statewide popular votes received in a given election.161 
Christopher Ingraham demonstrates why partisan gerrymandering 
matters by contrasting the results in North Carolina and Pennsylvania in 
light of Pennsylvania prohibiting extreme partisan gerrymandering in the 
2018 midterm elections, while North Carolina continued to embrace the 
same.162 
During the 2016 national elections, Democrats in North Carolina 
earned a 47% proportion of the statewide ballots cast for the House seats, 
but Democrats were awarded only a 23% proportion of the seats as a result 
of extreme partisan legislative redistricting.163 In Pennsylvania, Democrats 
earned a 48% proportion of the ballots cast in the state for House elections 
with opponents; nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Democrats received 27% 
of the seats.164 Ingraham contends that “[b]ig differences between popular 
votes and seat totals are one of the telltale signs of a heavily 
gerrymandered state. But the two states’ paths diverged after 2016.”165 
North Carolina used its gerrymandered districts during the 2018 
midterm election.166 In Pennsylvania, the state supreme court redrew the 
maps earlier in 2018 to prohibit extreme partisan gerrymandering.167 The 
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difference between extreme partisan gerrymandering and eliminating or 
reducing the effect of gerrymandering in the ballot box outcome is eye-
catching but very predictable.168 Since North Carolina retained its old 
maps of 2016, it achieved an electoral result in 2018 that was virtually 
identical to that of 2016.169 Although there was a Democratic wave in 
North Carolina where more than half of voters cast a ballot for a 
Democratic House candidate, North Carolina Democrats received only a 
quarter of the seats with opposition.170 Ingraham said, in Pennsylvania, “a 
53 percent majority in the popular vote yielded a hair under half of the 
contested seats — a big difference from 2016, when 48 percent of the vote 
gave Democrats 27 percent of the seats.”171 
The author of this Article believes the different congressional election 
outcomes in North Carolina and Pennsylvania provide realistic optic 
perceptions regarding how the gerrymandering process operates.172 A 
great deal of the misconception about how the current gerrymandering 
process operates, however, may be linked to the fact that the Court has 
failed to establish identifiable or manageable standards for separating 
partisan politics from racial targeting of voters.173  
The government should reject partisan gerrymandering and racial 
gerrymandering when redistricting to advance the democratic goal of fair 
representation and to prevent the return to the historical British practice of 
providing no real representation for Americans, because the British did not 
allow the Americans to have any input in the actual governing of their 
colony.174 A combination of partisan gerrymandering and using race as a 
factor pose a grave risk of placing targeted racial minority voters in 
legislative districts without any meaningful representation because voter 
dilution results in a lack of opportunity to provide input in selecting leaders 
in their districts.175  
Although the Supreme Court has historically left redistricting to the 
states, the Court has the authority to revise state legislative redistricting 
plans to assure fair and equal representation under the rationale of the 
Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr.176 In Baker, Justice William 
Brennan acknowledged that the Court has a judicial duty to assure fair and 
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equal representation to all people when legislative redistricting occurs 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177 
Justice Brennan’s declaration in the 1960s laid the foundation for plaintiffs 
to challenge legislative redistricting plans that fail to provide voters with 
equal representation in the legislative branch of government.178 The 
Supreme Court used the equal protection power established in Baker to 
prohibit unequal representation in legislative redistricting inspired by any 
consideration of either race or partisan politics.179  
Under the rationale of Baker,180 the Court should use its power to 
prohibit the use of the race factor in redistricting because the link between 
partisan political identity and racial targeting typically stereotypes and 
unfairly dilutes the vote of a racial minority. According to Donald Earl 
Collins, American history reveals that because race continues to identify 
where many Americans live as well as how many Americans vote, 
politicians continue to gerrymander voting districts in at least two states 
by playing the race card, because race significantly impacts almost every 
aspect of a person’s life in America.181 
A racial gerrymander occurs if race, rather than traditional criteria, 
such as recognizing city and county boundaries or attempting to shield an 
identifiable political party’s candidate from losing an election, is the 
“predominant factor” as to why the legislature established certain 
geographical lines without providing a compelling justification for giving 
so much deference to race.182  
The 2017 North Carolina case of Cooper v. Harris involved two North 
Carolina congressional districts, District 1 and District 12.183 North 
Carolina justified its redistricting plan on the theory that the disputed 
congressional districts were established for partisan political purposes and 
                                                                                                             
 177. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.  
 178. See Berman, supra note 156. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226. 
 181. Donald Earl Collins, Black history is U.S. history — but some of my 
students don’t want to hear it, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/02/07/black-history-is-u-s-history 
-but-some-of-my-students-dont-want-to-hear-it/ [https://perma.cc/VJH2-E537]. 
 182. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court may just have given voting rights 
activists a powerful new tool, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/opinions/voting-rights-activists-should-love-todays-supreme-court 
-ruling/2017/05/22/9443d726-3f2f-11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/HJ55-9E2Q] (originally titled “Kagan quietly declares war on 
gerrymandering”). 
 183. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 (2017). 
804 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
not racial purposes.184 The two congressional districts were designed to 
benefit Republicans, North Carolina contended, not to redistribute white 
and black voters.185 Since North Carolina knew the Supreme Court had 
never invalidated a gerrymandered district that articulated a plausible 
appearance of a partisan gerrymander, it was necessary for the state to 
articulate that this was partisan politics and not race to survive a legal 
challenge.186 Professor Richard L. Hasen, the chancellor’s professor of law 
and political science at the University of California at Irvine and the author 
of Plutocrats United, believes some of the statements Associate Justice 
Elena Kagan made in the Cooper187 opinion demonstrate the problematic 
nature of the intersection of partisan politics and the race factor.188 Justice 
Kagan asserted, “[W]hen it comes to drawing congressional districts, race 
and party are not necessarily separate categories.”189 Hasen thinks Justice 
Kagan believes “the sorting of voters on the grounds of their race remains 
suspect even if race is meant to function as a proxy for other, including 
political, characteristics.”190 Although Justice Kagan’s views are a step in 
the right direction, they do not go far enough, because neither race nor 
partisan politics should be considered as a factor in redistricting. When 
redistricting of congressional districts is involved, race and partisan 
politics are often not separate categories, and there is no principled way to 
distinguish partisan political gerrymandering from racial gerrymandering 
under the equal protection of the law.191  
CONCLUSION 
Determining whether the design of a congressional district is 
motivated by either a racial or partisan reason poses a virtually impossible 
challenge for a federal court.192 If the U.S. Supreme Court continues to 
allow fake partisan political advantage to be a factor in deciding 
redistricting cases alleging a real racial gerrymander, virtually everyone 
will raise the fake-partisan-politics defense.193 The prestige of the Supreme 
Court is at risk if it is perceived as endorsing either a fake-partisan-politics 
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claim to provide cover for racial targeting in redistricting or permitting 
partisan political advantage to exist at the expense of fair representation in 
the nation’s congressional districts. 
The most practical way for the Supreme Court to make progress in 
situations involving redistricting is by respecting conformity to traditional 
districting principles, such as compactness and respect for county lines as 
long as those districts are established free of partisan politics or racial 
considerations.194 The government should delete race and partisan politics 
from redistricting because political and racial reasons are capable of 
yielding similar oddities that block a district’s ability to produce fair 
representation within its boundaries.195 The similar results, which block 
the goal of fair representation in our democracy, exist because racial 
identification is interrelated to political involvement.196 As a result of these 
highly correlated redistricting realities, the Supreme Court has a 
formidable task of instructing lower courts in gerrymandering cases to 
engage in “a sensitive inquiry” into all “circumstantial and direct evidence 
of intent” to assess whether the plaintiff can simply prove that either race 
or partisanship was a factor in establishing a district’s lines.197 As soon as 
possible, the Court should prohibit the use of race and partisan politics as 
factors in redistricting because the secondary effects produced by both 
unnecessarily obstruct the democratic goal of fair representation in 
Congress and state legislative houses. 
 
                                                                                                             
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. (citing Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Contra id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
